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ABSTRACT
Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, public schools may only
restrict student speech where the speech is reasonably forecasted
to cause a “substantial and material disruption.” With online
forums calling into question who may control speech and forecast
its impact, the circuit courts have granted public schools broad
authority to monitor, and punish, their students for online activity
that occurs off-campus. The Supreme Court recently declined the
opportunity to reverse this disturbing trend by denying certiorari
for Bell v. Itawamba County. As a result, questions remain
unanswered regarding students’ right to free speech and how
courts should address First Amendment cases in the digital realm.

INTRODUCTION
Today’s high school students often express themselves digitally,
utilizing texts, Facebook, Tweets, and Tumblr to share their innermost
thoughts and impressions.1 One of the hallmarks of online speech is its
ability to be quickly copied and disseminated, allowing an original thought
to be perpetually shared and duplicated outside the control of the original
speaker.
Circuit courts have struggled to apply First Amendment law to
online speech. As a result, there has been a lack of uniformity in their
application of the First Amendment to issues like occupational speech2 and
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Amanda Lenhart, It Ain’t Heavy, It’s My Smartphone: American Teens & the
Infiltration of Mobility into Their Computing Lives, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June
14, 2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/06/14/it-aint-heavy-itsmy-smartphone-american-teens-and-the-infiltration-of-mobility-into-theircomputing-lives/.
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Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 201–02 (5th Cir. 2011) (cert. denied Nov. 30
2015) (holding that a content-neutral regulations of the veterinary practice that
require a veterinarian “physically examine an animal . . . before treating it” does
not violate the First Amendment”).
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online threats.3 The Supreme Court has never addressed how online speech
should be analyzed under the First Amendment, and has, at times,
deliberately sidestepped the issue when presented directly.4
One of the most important questions is how public schools can
regulate and punish the online speech of their students. The seminal case
relating to this topic is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District5, a 1969 case permitting schools to only punish speech
which causes or leads the school to forecast a “material and substantial
interference” at the school.6 The years since Tinker have seen a number of
other cases which chip away at Tinker’s protections, as well as
technological innovations that change the way students communicate. The
ambiguity regarding Tinker’s application to online speech has allowed
public schools to use the “material and substantial interference” rule as a
justification to invade their students’ privacy and punish them for speech
originating off-campus.
The Court had a chance to address this question in Bell v.
Itawamba County School Board,7 a Fifth Circuit case in which a student
was punished for a song he recorded and uploaded off-campus, but denied
certiorari.8 With the Court now persisting on a course of declining to
address online speech cases, circuit courts continue to advance competing
views that erode the First Amendment rights of public school students.

I. THE EVOLVING TINKER STANDARD
Before Tinker, it was not clear whether First Amendment
protections for public school students ended at the school door.9 Tinker—
which held that a public school could not punish students for wearing
black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War— was a decisive victory
for students, creating a “material and substantial interference” test that

3

See Elonis, 135 S.Ct.; U.S. v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011);
Jackson v. Ladner, 626 F. App’x. 80 (5th Cir. 2015).
4
See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (“Given our
disposition [reading a mens rea requirement of at least knowledge into the statute
and holding that the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea under the
statute], it is not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.”).
5
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6
Id. at 511.
7
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S.Ct. 1166 (2016).
8
See id.
9
Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2009).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

157

balanced the necessity of an orderly school environment with the rights
and freedoms afforded to students by the Constitution.10
In considering what constitutes a “material and substantial
interference,” cases that came before the Court seemed to hinge less on an
actual disruption to the schoolroom and more on the Court’s own sense of
decorum, or judgment calls on what students should and should not be
exposed to.
In Bethel School. District No. 403 v. Fraser, 11 the Court held that
a high school could punish a student who gave a “lewd” speech,
incorporating sexual references and hip thrusting, at a school assembly.12
It caused great amusement among most classmates, confusion among
others, and fury and embarrassment on the part of the teachers.13 While
not beyond what one might encounter in the average high school hallway,
the Court held that the speech could be punished, citing “bewilderment”
shown by some students who did not fully understand the sexual innuendo
as evidence of a substantial and material disruption.14 This was the first
time that student confusion, without evidence that such confusion caused
further disruption, satisfied the Tinker standard.
The Court continued to broaden the right of schools to punish
student speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.15 In
Hazelwood, a school district deleted two pages from articles from an issue
of the student-led newspaper.16 These articles were about teen pregnancy
and divorce, featuring interviews with unidentified students who had
experience with such issues.17 The principal feared these students (or their
families) would be embarrassed when the articles were published, even
though the students had consented to the interviews.18 The majority noted
this was not a case about tolerating speech, as in Tinker, but was rather a
case about “promoting” speech (the school allowing the newspaper to be
published would be seen as a promotion of the speech inside).19 In this
context, the Court seemed to focus on what was “appropriate” for the
school environment, remarking that, “such frank talk was inappropriate in

10

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; Clay Weisenberger, Constitution or Conformity: When
the Shirt Hits the Fan in Public Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 51, 52–53 (2000).
11
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
12
Id. at 685.
13
Id. at 678.
14
Id. at 683.
15
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 U.S. 560, 562 (1988).
16
Id. at 565.
17
Id. at 565–66.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 569–70.
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a school-sponsored publication . . . .”20 Recognizing that this did not meet
the Tinker standard, the Court held that Tinker need not be applied when
said speech was being published under the school’s name (here, as part of
a school-sponsored publication).21 A school may censor such content if
such censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”22 There was, however, no concern evidenced that the
newspaper publication would appear to have been written by the school,
or even officially approved by the school before publication. It was
presented as wholly the work of the students, and yet, because the school
facilitated the speech by publishing the newspaper, the Court allowed
censorship of speech without application of Tinker.
The Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick23 is the closest the
Court has come to determining whether off-campus speech is subject to
Tinker.24 The student in Morse held up a banner reading “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” while at a school-sponsored function.25 Though this did not take
place directly on school grounds, it was just outside the actual school,
happened during school hours, and took place at a school event, making it
virtually indistinguishable from in-school speech. The banner was held up
in front of television cameras.26 It undoubtedly caused embarrassment to
the school, but it is less apparent that it caused a substantial and material
disruption to the school environment. The Court, finding that the banner
was a disruption, limited its holding to restricting student speech at a
school event when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.27 The Court’s reasoning distilled down to a fear that the banner
would undo the school’s hard work in warning students about the dangers
of drugs. The Court thought “peer pressure” was a leading cause of drug
abuse by students,28 and worried that allowing the banner to go unpunished
would allow students to pressure their peers into using drugs. Such an
argument fails to utilize any part of the Tinker analysis. Nowhere in the
Court’s analysis was a substantial and material disruption identified.
20

Id. at 572.
Id. at 571.
22
Id.
23
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
24
In his dissent, Justice Stevens notes the off-campus nature of the speech. “It is
also relevant that the display did not take place “on school premises,” as the rule
contemplates. While a separate district rule does make the policy applicable to
“social events and class trips,” Frederick might well have thought that the
Olympic Torch Relay was neither a “social event” (for example, prom) nor a
“class trip.” Id. at 440 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
25
Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
26
Id. at 399.
27
Id. at 397.
28
Id. at 408.
21
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Instead, it found a long-term interest in preventing drug abuse—which
may never have manifested itself while the listeners were students. This
case punished the speech simply for its offensive nature, or more
generously, for its potential long-term effects, rather than the actual or
possible effect on the school environment.29
What is most concerning about these decisions is their passing
consideration of the actual or projected impact of the speech at the school,
instead focusing on the Court’s subjective perception of the speech. What
is shocking, offensive, or indecorous to courts may very likely be
commonplace to high-school students, and what is commonplace is less
likely to disrupt the school environment. Because judges and justices are
far closer in age to the administrators, courts have tended to interpret
speech similarly to teachers and administrators.30 However, since Tinker
hinges on student reactions, Tinker requires that student perceptions be
considered. Because students are so acclimated to explicit or sexual
language, they are much less likely to be “disrupted” with sexually explicit
or profanity-laced speech.31 The above cases have therefore twisted Tinker
into a license to punish speech that is not materially disruptive, but merely
offensive to judicial and administrative sensibilities.
In light of this erosion, Tinker’s application must be specifically
examined in the context of online speech by the ultimate authority of the
Supreme Court. The alternative is that Tinker will continue to be used as
a one-size-fits-all justification by school administrators to censor student
speech.

II. TINKER AND ONLINE SPEECH
Questions about a public school’s right to punish online speech
became a concern shortly after online forums for speech (e.g. Myspace,
chat rooms, and digital hangouts) first began appearing online.32 The
question in such cases is whether a school has any right to punish off29

Further, the Court was clear that there was no other applicable First Amendment
doctrine beside Tinker that could be applied in this case. See id. at 393
(“Frederick’s argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected.”).
30
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1092 (2008) (“[L]ower courts applying the Tinker standard have
tended to give substantial deference to a school's determination that the challenged
expressive activity was in fact substantially and materially disruptive.”).
31
See, e.g., Anna-Brita Stenström, TRENDS IN TEENAGE TALK: CORPUS
COMPILATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 78 (1996) (“Even the most obscene words
do not seem to offend the teenagers.”).
32
See Marie L. Bittner, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Students’ First
Amendment Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 86 CLEARING HOUSE 174 ,176
(2013).
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campus speech—in short, whether Tinker should even apply to off-campus
speech, regardless of its effect.
It was not until 2008 that any circuit addressed a case of a student
punished for speech that originated off-campus.33 Since then, four other
circuits (totaling five) have considered the issue, advancing several
different approaches on how to best determine when off-campus speech
can be punished.34 No circuit court has completely protected online speech
from the schools. In fact, current approaches advocated by the circuit
courts allow for all speech by teenagers enrolled in public schools to be
considered “student speech,” which may seriously infringe on student
freedom of speech.

A. The “Foreseeability” Test
In Doninger v. Niehoff, the second circuit held that a high-school
student could be punished for a blog post where she expressed frustration
with one of her teachers.35 The court recognized that the off-campus nature
of the speech was problematic:
“If Avery had distributed her electronic posting as a handbill on
school grounds, this case would fall squarely within the Supreme
Court's precedents recognizing that the nature of a student's First
Amendment rights must be understood in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment… [i]t is not clear, however,
that [these precedents] appl[y] to off-campus speech.”36

Despite this recognition, the court decided that Tinker was
applicable, as school discipline is permissible where it is “reasonably
foreseeable that the [speech] would come to the attention of school
authorities and that it would create a risk of substantial disruption.”37 In
other words, any speech by students is subject to the jurisdiction of school
administrators so long as the material or substantial interruption required
by Tinker is foreseeable, regardless of where or when it originated.
This “foreseeability test” is not clearly defined in Doninger or any
subsequent cases which rely on the second circuit’s holding. It alters the
foreseeability test defined in Tinker, where Tinker looks at what the school
could reasonably foresee, not what the student could reasonably foresee.
The analysis, however, appears to be the same. In Doninger, the factors
that led the court to determine Tinker was applicable were the same factors
33

See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
The First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the
Supreme Court, have been wholly silent.
35
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45, 53.
36
Id. at 49.
37
Id. at 50.
34
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that allowed the court to determine Tinker could punish Doninger’s
speech. Although there appears to be a separate part of the analysis given
in the opinion— that it must first be foreseeable that the speech would
come to the attention of the school authorities— courts assume if the
speech can foreseeably cause a substantial or material disruption, it is
foreseeable that it will reach the school authorities. Therefore, there is
really no separate analysis being undertaken. Once the court has
determined the speech can reach the school authority, it has already
determined the speech can be forecasted to cause a substantial or material
disruption.
The idea that Tinker must apply wherever it can punish is
troubling, as it suggests limitless application of Tinker. The Fourth Circuit
has created a test with a different name but a similar problem, as it too
allows Tinker to apply wherever it can punish.38

B. “Sufficient Nexus” Test
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit held that a middle-school girl who
created a MySpace page targeting one of her classmates could be punished
by her school.39 Rather than adopt wholesale the “foreseeability” test
presented by the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit created an even more
nebulous test, holding that Tinker can be extended to speech which has a
sufficiently strong nexus with the school’s pedagogical interests.40 The
pedagogical interest here was preventing bullying.41 The court did
consider foreseeability in determining whether the nexus existed, holding
“it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski's conduct would reach the
school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices . . . .”42
This test for foreseeability, coupled with the victim’s shame and hurt,
allowed Kowalski’s off-campus speech to be punished as if it had occurred
on-campus.
Kowalski presented a far less sympathetic student than that of
Doninger— here was a student who targeted and bullied one of her
classmates, encouraged other classmates to join in, and, undoubtedly,
caused great pain and embarrassment to her victim.43 The court seemed
offended that she would even bring a lawsuit alleging a violation her
rights, adding this admonishment to the opinion:
38

Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.
40
See id. at 573.
41
See id. at 572 (“[S]chool administrators must be able to prevent and punish
harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school environment conducive
to learning.”)
42
Id. at 574.
43
See id. at 567–68.
39
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Rather than respond constructively to the school’s efforts to bring
order and provide a lesson following the incident, Kowalski has
rejected those efforts and sued school authorities for damages and
other relief. Regretfully, she yet fails to see that such harassment and
bullying is inappropriate and hurtful and that it must be taken
seriously by school administrators in order to preserve an appropriate
pedagogical environment.44

In such cyber-bullying cases there is undeniable appeal in
allowing schools to punish such conduct. If not the school, who? What
other institution has the power to stop such an insidious and harmful form
of student-on-student misconduct? Yet Kowalski’s holding is another
example of how allowing Tinker to punish online speech erodes the First
Amendment rights of our nation’s youth, expanding the reach of public
schools to regulate the speech of students when they are outside of school
grounds and off school time.45
By reimagining the facts of Kowalski as a genuine off-campus,
face-to-face interaction between the students, the idea of the school
punishing the student for her speech seems far less likely. Allowing the
school such power would be to give the school the right to reach into the
private lives of their students. The end result would have been nearly the
same— shame and hurt for the victim, and student gossip the following
day among the students, which of course would have been foreseeable on
the part of the bully— but the school would likely not have had the power
to punish the bully. After all, in this hypothetical circumstance, the bully
was acting outside her capacity as a student. The dichotomy is unjustified.
Expanding Tinker into off-campus, online speech would suggest that
Americans in the public school system are forced to surrender their First
Amendment rights between the ages of five and eighteen.46
Moreover, the Kowalski holding once again allows Tinker to apply
wherever it can punish. Here, the “pedagogical interest” can include
keeping order in the classroom, or preventing a substantial disruption. The
nexus is established based on the foreseeability that the speech would
reach the classroom and disrupt this pedagogical interest. The analysis,
then, jumps immediately to the Tinker analysis (and, indeed, the school’s
44

Id. at 577.
See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1399 (2000) (“[T]he Court has indicated that its decisions limiting the rights
of students in school do not limit their rights outside of school.”).
46
See Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of
Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 572, 597 (2009) (“In and out of class,
permissible conduct is defined by what is proper conduct of students qua students.
Meaning, students acting in their capacity as students. The Court's decision [in
Tinker] only regulated the student-school relationship.” (emphasis added)).
45
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punishment of Kowalski was found to be acceptable under Tinker),47 as
though there is no distinction between targeted bullying on school grounds
and an online event outside of school.

C. Remaining Circuit Approaches
The third,48 eighth,49 and ninth50 circuits have taken similar
positions, largely adopting Doninger’s foreseeability test. Most cases in
these circuits have punished students for their off-campus speech, though
one case in the third circuit applied the Tinker standard and found the
speech could not be punished because no substantial and material
disruption was caused or foreseen.51 On one hand, J.S. ex rel Snyder seems
to have a positive effect for student speech rights, as it moves away from
the idea that any speech that can be punished under the “substantial and
material disruption” standard; on the other hand, this case assumes Tinker
can be applied to all student speech regardless of its actual effect, once
again reinforcing the idea that schools have unbounded authority to at least
evaluate the speech their students’ while off campus.52 This raises
questions of just how far a school can reach. Can they punish speech that
occurs over summer vacation? What about speech from several years ago
that remains in digital form?
In 2014, the Fifth Circuit appeared to have a similar holding to
that of J.S. ex rel Snyder, until a rehearing returned to the idea that Tinker
should be able to punish any speech that could foreseeably cause a
substantial and material disruption. Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board,53 was the most recent case to confront Tinker’s applicability to
online speech, even requesting certiorari (an appearance before the
Supreme Court).

D. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board a high school student
and aspiring rapper named Marcus Bell created a rap song naming and
47

Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574.
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011).
49
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2012)
50
Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
51
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931–33.
52
In most student speech cases, the punishment comes after the disruption, when
the school has been able to observe exactly what the effects of the speech are.
However, because Tinker allows a school to punish where it is foreseeable that
the speech might cause a disruption, it is possible that schools could search the
online lives of their students for speech that might conceivably reach the school
and cause a disruption, raising additional privacy concerns.
53
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015)
48
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shaming two teachers at his school for sexually harassing several female
students.54 His speech caused no demonstrable substantial or material
disruption, though one of the teachers admitted to adopting a less familiar
teaching style with female students55 (arguably preventing further school
disruption). The song was played only once on school grounds, by one of
the accused teachers, who accessed it by listening to it on a student’s smart
phone, against school policy.56
When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, a three-judge panel,
without explicitly finding that Tinker could reach the speech, found there
was no (actual or foreseeable) substantial or material disruption caused by
the speech.57 The school board appealed and at a rehearing a divided panel
reversed.58 The majority focused on what they considered to be “threats”
in Bell’s song59 and held that, though Tinker’s application to off-campus
speech was not a resolved issue, “Bell's admittedly intentionally directing
at the school community his rap recording containing threats to, and
harassment and intimidation of, two teachers permits Tinker's application
in this instance.”60
A dissent by Judge James L. Dennis took issue with both the idea
that Tinker could reach off-campus speech in general and the idea that
Bell’s speech caused a substantial and material disruption.61 On the first
point, Dennis noted that a textual analysis of Tinker, as well as subsequent
student speech cases by the Court, supported the notion that only speech
which took place inside the school or at school-sponsored events could be
punished. Tinker’s language not only referenced speech that took place
“inside the schoolyard gate” but also the “special characteristics of the
school environment,” while noting that “school officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students.”6263

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (2014), rev’d on rehearing en
banc, 799 F.3d 379 (2015).
55
Id. at 290.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 282.
58
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 382 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1166 (2016).
59
Namely, “get a pistol down your mouth” and “gonna hit you with my Ruger,”
which Bell stated were not direct threats and the teachers admitted they did not
take seriously. Bell, 774 F.3d at 309–10.
60
Bell, 799 F.3d at 394.
61
Id. at 403–33 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
62
Id. at 384 (majority opinion).
63
While it is true that Tinker also states that “conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior— materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
54
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Of all the student speech cases that have been heard, Bell was
perhaps the best contender to reach the Supreme Court and establish the
first real precedent on how student speech should be addressed. The
speaker in question was not a student bully or an aggrieved student merely
complaining about unfair policies; rather, he was being censored for
bringing educators’ sexual misconduct to the students’ attention.
However, like each case before it that appealed to the court, Bell’s petition
for certiorari was eventually denied by the Court.

III. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS REMAINING
A. Student: A Day Job, or a State of Being?
By allowing off-campus speech to be punished by schools, courts
implicitly hold that any child who is enrolled in public school is a student
both on and off campus. The Fifth Circuit’s en banc holding in Bell
described “students qua students” or students acting in the capacity of
students.64 The court apparently believed that public-school attendees are
always acting in the capacity of students whenever they create any speech
that might be related to school, the students or faculty, or their feeling
about the institution itself. The dissent noted this worrisome assertion:
By simply assuming that all children speak “qua students,” the
majority’s legal analysis begins with the false premise that the speech
at issue constitutes “student speech” that must be “tempered in the
light of a school official’s duty” to teach students appropriate
behavior. But the Supreme Court has never suggested that minors’
constitutional rights outside of school are somehow qualified if they
coincidentally are enrolled in a public school.65

When a child enrolled in public school returns home for the day,
are they still a “student?” If not, their speech can hardly be termed “student
speech.” It is true that the school day takes up much of a student’s time,
and is where the majority of their relationships are formed (though the
online world has even changed this; students can form close relationships

invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech,” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added), which would seem to suggest that
Tinker’s exception does apply to off-campus speech, the opinion previously refers
to comments made between students “outside of the classroom,” referring to the
school hallways. Therefore this sentence is best understood to allow regulation of
any speech occurring on school grounds, whether during class or elsewhere in the
school, and not as a license for the school to regulate off-campus conduct.
64
Bell, 799 F.3d at 389.
65
Id. at 415 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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with people they may never meet in person).66 However, the school’s
influence surely must end somewhere. It would be unheard of for a school
to punish a student for not following a school dress code when that student
was at home on a Saturday. Digital verbal speech, however, has been
judged in Bell and the like cases as something over which a public school
should have a broader control.
There comes a point when a school’s ability to regulate comes into
conflict with a parent’s right to discipline and control their own child. The
Supreme Court has previously addressed this issue in the context of in loco
parentis.67 This doctrine has been articulated as early as the 1800s by
American courts.68 In brief, the doctrine allows schools to assume the
power of parents during the school day, so they may punish student
behavior which would disrupt the school environment.69 It suggests that
there is a clear delineation between a student on school grounds and a
student at home, particularly in the context of what rights a school has over
the student. Allowing schools to regulate online/off-campus speech puts
schools in the position as acting as their students’ “parent” at all times.
This broad power thus conflicts with a parent’s right to discipline,
though circuit court have yet to recognize this as a consequence of broad
school control over student speech. In Bell, the student’s mother, Dora
Bell, alleged violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to make
decisions regarding the care and custody of her child.70 The district court
dismissed this claim,71 and no other court has recognized this as a viable
claim in similar student-speech cases.

66

See Wendy Walsh, Janis Wolak, & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Close Relationships
with People Met Online in a National U.S. Sample of Adolescents, 7
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (2013).
67
See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 383 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–
55 (1995).
68
See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (N.C. 1837).
69
See Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 413.
70
Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 859 F.Supp.2d 834, 841 (N.D. Miss. 2012),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 774 F.3d 280 (2014).
71
The court acknowledged that there was a conflict, but held this did not equate
to a violation of Dora Bell’s constitutional rights. Under the prevailing standard
set by Gruenke v. Seip, a school punishment that conflicts with the interests of the
parents may prevail if the punishment is “tied to a compelling interest.” Gruenke
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir.2000). Because protecting the school from a
substantial and material disruption can always be termed a “compelling interest,”
Fourteenth Amendment claims by parents in student speech cases are unlikely to
be successful if the Third Circuit test is widely adopted. There does not appear to
be any Supreme Court cases offering a different test.
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B. “Threatening” Online Speech
One of the chief concerns noted in the Bell opinion was the issue
of “threatening” speech, with the opinion suggesting that shielding such
speech from punishment might have dire consequences given the
prevalence of school violence in recent years.72 This reasoning, however,
ignores current First Amendment law, which already has recourse to
punish speech which threatens the safety of students and administrators.
Before a Tinker analysis can even begin, the speech in question
must first clear other First Amendment hurdles. If a student were to hang
up an obscene drawing in school, for example, his punishment would not
undergo a Tinker analysis but rather a Miller analysis— the test which
determines whether a communication falls under the “obscenity”
exception to the First Amendment.73 Courts have also carved out
exceptions to the First Amendment where speech is threatening,74 meaning
that threats of school shootings or constant threats of death or injury would
likely never even reach a Tinker analysis. Instead, the speech would be
curtailed by a broader exception that applies to all Americans, not just
students.
If a “true threat” analysis would have been performed in Bell,
Bell’s speech would have likely been found to be protected, as Watts v.
United States75 ruled that threats which are obviously hyperbole are
protected by the First Amendment.76 Bell’s lyrics were not meant to be
taken seriously as threats, and in fact were not taken seriously by anyone
within the school; thus, Watts would likely hold it to be protected speech.
There is no reason to believe that Bell’s speech would need to undergo
some deeper level of scrutiny simply because its subject was about two
teachers. The Supreme Court has never made any rulings to the effect that
a response to threats should be heightened when in a school environment,
or that Watts would somehow not suffice to distinguish a student’s
protected hyperbolic speech from a student’s unprotected threatening
speech.
72

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 432–34 (2015) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
73
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
74
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat.”)
75
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
76
Id. at 708.

168

SCHOOLS, SPEECH, AND SMARTPHONES

[Vol. 15

In fact, a “true-threat” analysis might even serve as a tool against
cyber-bullying. The Eighth Circuit has previously applied this analysis to
off-campus student speech in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School
District,77 in which an eighth grade student wrote two violent and
threatening letters to his ex-girlfriend.78 In these letters he berated her,
insulted her, and threatened to rape and kill her.79 The letters were written
off-campus and were brought to school by a third student after the victim
had already heard it, making it off-campus speech.80 Rather than consider
how Tinker should be applied, the Second Circuit focused on the
threatening nature of the speech, holding that it fell under the “true threat”
exception to the First Amendment.81
Pulaski did not feature online speech, but the same principle could
apply to threats posted on Facebook or Twitter. It is true that many
instances of cyber-bullying would not rise to this level of threat.
Nonetheless, a true threat analysis is certainly a viable option in the most
severe of cases, and it is the appropriate recourse when considering actual
threats against the school and its students or administrators, as alleged in
Bell. Further, schools have other means of recourse to prevent them from
being helpless in the face of cyber-bullying, such as counseling for the
bully and victim, which turns the situation into a learning experience rather
than a First Amendment minefield.82
There is no evidence that a school has ever used the Tinker
exception to stop a planned act of school violence, as such cases would
likely require police involvement, not an act of school discipline. Giving
schools the right under Tinker to punish off-campus threats would likely
lead to punishing speech of the kind identified in the Watts exception and
identified in Bell— hyperbolic statements made out of frustration by
children who are using what they think is a safe outlet for their personal
feelings. In such hyperbolic cases, the “forecasted” school disruption is
more unreasonable than foreseeable, and punishing students for venting
their frustrations could do more harm than good.
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Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 619.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 632.
81
Id. at 622.
82
See Papandrea, supra note 30, at 1098. Counseling would be unlikely to be
considered a “punishment” or suppression of speech for which a student could
seek a legal remedy, as there would be unlikely to be an injury on which a student
could establish standing for suit.
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C. The Necessity of Student Freedom of Expression
It can be easy to think of student speech in terms of the harm it
can cause: the victims of bullying, the in-school disruptions, the possible
in-school violence. Such consequences to speech are really only present in
the school environment, perhaps explaining why Tinker’s exception
erodes First Amendment protection granted to adults. But children and
teenagers benefit most from freedom of expression,83 and curtailing their
rights might have grave consequences.
The Supreme Court itself has noted that “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”84 That character is
formed by exploration, by experience, and by expression. It has been longheld that freedom of expression leads to discovery of truth,85 and there is
arguably no group in greater search of truth than juveniles. The Supreme
Court has even noted that it is through exposure to new information that a
student passes from the realm of a child, whose constitutional rights are in
some manners curtailed, to an adult.86
Furthermore, curtailing the rights of children on the assumption
that children require special regulation, due to their fragility or inability to
think before they speak, does harm to all of society. The social significance
of affording right of expression to children sends a message to society as
a whole that expression is to be celebrated and encouraged from a young
age, and promotes important discourse in every age group.87
Allowing schools to access and judge students’ online thoughts
also raises grave concerns about student privacy. Settings on profiles such
as on Facebook might allow students to regulate who is able to see their
A child’s right to freedom of expression is in fact so important that it has been
recognized by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, art. 13, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The child
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of the child's choice.”).
84
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
85
Stanley Ingber , The Marketplace of Ideas, A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 3 (referencing Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919)).
86
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (allowing a teenaged student to
make a decision about an abortion if she could show she was “mature and well
enough informed.”); see also Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (discussing the importance of the
right to receive information in the public school setting).
87
John Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights, 6 INT’L
J. L., POL’Y, & THE FAM., 221, 224 (1992).
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posts, but schools, claiming a concern about a potential disruption, could
easily curtail such restrictions. Indeed, in Bell, the rap song was initially
posted on Facebook under settings that only allowed Bell’s online friends
access. Students who post something anonymously could be identified by
the public if the school could claim a material disruption, to identify the
speaker. Giving school administrators the right to examine “private”
thoughts, or at least those meant to be shared with a select group of people,
is akin to flipping through a student’s diary. Online privacy is a nebulous
idea and has been left largely untouched by courts.88 The privacy of
students is an important issue that demands resolution.
Today many school campuses restrict the ability to access social
media sites where much off-campus online speech can be found.
Therefore, when this speech comes to campus, it usually comes on
smartphones, as in Bell. Just as schools hold searches of lockers or bags
for reasonably expected incriminating material, will we be seeing routine
searches of smartphones for inappropriate texts or online posts under the
broad Tinker justification?

CONCLUSION
Tinker is considered a landmark case, not for affording schools the
right to punish speech, but for the broad freedom of expression it gives
public school students. In the years following Tinker, the Court has
seemingly regretted giving students such freedom, and has carved
numerous exceptions to Tinker’s ultimate provision: that there are only
very rare circumstances where student expression can be punished.
Today, teenagers’ speech is particularly vulnerable to school
punishment due to digital media. Without clear direction from the Court,
the circuits have adopted conflicting approaches to when schools can
punish speech originating off-campus. This not only gives schools greater
control over teenagers’ off-campus lives, but sends a message that student
speech is less worthy of protection than that of adults.
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See Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line
Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 129 (2005).

